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BATSON V KENTUCKY AND J.E.B. V
ALABAMA EX REL. TB.: IS THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE STILL
PREEMINENT?
"Buckley will save his peremptory challenges for the blacks. We
know that. We've got to concentrate on white people."
"Women," said Lucien. "Always pick women for criminal trials.
They have bigger hearts, bleeding hearts, and they're much more
sympathetic. Always go for women."
"Naw," said Harry Rex. "Not in this case. Women don't under-
stand things like taking a gun and blowing people away. You need
fathers, young fathers who would want to do the same thing Halley
did. Daddys with little girls.'"
The right to strike a limited number of jurors for any reason has
been a part of the American jury trial since 1790. 2 Several recent
United States Supreme Court decisions, however, have limited the use
of the peremptory challenge to a degrees Since 1986, peremptory
challenges exercised on the basis of a potential juror's race violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Moreover,
last Term, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the United States Supreme
Court expanded the Equal Protection prohibition against race-based
peremptory challenges to include gender.' Prior to J.E.B., attorneys
often considered the gender of potential jurors when selecting a jury, 6
and social scientists debated the role of gender in the outcome of jury
deliberations.? The question of whether J.E.B. will limit this practice or
quiet the debate remains.
1 JOHN GRISHAM, A. TIME TO KILL 269 (1989).
2
 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214 (1965) (citing 1 Stat. 119 (1790)),
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348, 2353, 2359 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991);
Powers v, Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986).
4 See infra notes 8-12.
5 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
6 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, fury Service and Community Representation, in VERDICT 463
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
7 VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76 (1986) (majority of studies found
no significant differences in way men and women perceive and react to trials; some, however,
found women either more defense or prosecution-oriented); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE
JURY 140 (1983) (student and citizen judgments for typical criminal case materials reveal no
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In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky,
held that prosecutors' use of race-based peremptory challenges in
criminal trials violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 Through subsequent decisions, the Court provided for
symmetrical application of Batson to all parties in civil and criminal
trials.9 For example, neither defendants nor prosecutors in criminal
trials may use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors be-
cause of their race." Plaintiffs and defendants in civil trials are subject
to these standards in their use of peremptory challenges as well." The
Court also extended standing to defendants of one race to object to
peremptory challenges of different race jurors. 12
A split in both state and federal courts as to whether Batson also
prohibited gender-based peremptory challenges prompted the Supreme
Court to consider the issue last Term in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B."
After Alabama courts declined to extend Batson to cover gender-based
peremptory strikes in a paternity suit, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that peremptory challenges exercised on
the basis of a potential juror's gender violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Thus, gender is no longer a valid basis for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge."
This Note argues that the Court has not provided trial courts
much guidance concerning the implementation of the broad dictates
gender-based verdict preferences). Many studies, however, have found females significantly more
likely than males to regard the defendant in a rape case as guilty. Id. at 140-41. In addition, males
participate at higher rates in deliberation than females. Id.
8 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986).
9 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353, 2359 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, I 1 1 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991). See generally infra
notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
I° McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353, 2359.
11 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
12 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
13 114 S. Ct. at 1422 & n.l. For example, the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have refused
to extend the protection of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the use of gender-based
peremptory challenges. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 990 (1992); United
States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, however, in the 1992 case, United States
v. De Gross, that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of gender-based peremptory
challenges. 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The disagreement extends to appli-
cation in state courts as well. Compare New York v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges violate Fourteenth Amendment) with
State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.1. 1987) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges
do not violate Fourteenth Amendment).
14.J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421; see infra notes 233-88.
15/E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
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that Batson and its progeny require. 16 Courts are left with the rela-
tively unguided duty of determining if counsel has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to strike a potential juror because of the juror's race
or gender.' 7 Courts have proven ill-equipped to evaluate proffered
race-neutral justifications. 18
 Federal circuit court decisions have not
achieved Batson's goal of ferreting-out race-based peremptory chal-
lenges.° J.E.B.'s extension of Batson to cover gender will result in an
equally ineffective attempt to eliminate gender as a basis for peremp-
tory strikes.20 Attorneys who seek to eliminate a potential juror because
of the juror's gender will merely contrive a facially gender-neutral
explanation if necessary. 2 ' The Court's continuous chipping away of
the peremptory challenge through expansion of the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause further complicates this area of law. 22 Thus, the time
has come for a comprehensive examination of the peremptory chal-
lenge system and for the effectuation of global rules of procedure to
make the system more effective.
Section I of this Note provides an overview of the jury system. It
examines the jury selection process, the history behind the peremp-
tory challenge and the current debate concerning the preservation of
the challenge. 23 Section II focuses on the Supreme Court decisions that
sought to eliminate peremptory challenges based on race. 24 Section III
considers the effectiveness of those decisions through an examination
of the proffered race-neutral explanations in 113 federal appellate
court decisions that have applied Batson.25 Finally, Section IV argues
that the development of the peremptory challenge system through the
evolution of the common law will not provide a comprehensive system
for the effective application of Batson. 2' Thus, the Judicial Conference,
under the auspices of the Rules Enabling Act, should face the peremp-
tory challenge head-on by examining the system and recommending
new Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure that would apply
guidelines for the use of peremptory challenges in federal court.
16 See infra notes 122-287 and accompanying text; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24; id. at
130-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38 See infra notes 288-348 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes '288-348 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 349-58 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 349-51 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 352.
23 See infra notes 26-86 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 87-287 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 288-348 arid accompanying text,
26 See infra notes 349-58 and accompanying text.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM
A. Selecting a Jury
The Constitution guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury
in almost all criminal27
 and civil cases." Jury selection is one of the
most important aspects of a jury trial." Many trial lawyers and com-
mentators believe that the composition of the jury will greatly effect
the verdict."
Federal law requires federal trial courts to choose juries at random
from a fair cross section of the community in the court's districts'
Courts usually determine the pool of potential jurors from voter reg-
istration lists. 32
 Courts derive a list of potential jurors by selecting, at
random, a number of people from the total jury pool." These people
are notified that they are selected for jury service and are required to
complete a juror qualification form. 34
 The selected persons are either
27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except Cases of Inipeachment,
shall be by jury ...."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed
28 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.").
29 Morton Hunt, PutiingJuries on the Couch, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, § VI, at 70, 82 ("Jury
selection is one of the most important functions a trial lawyer can perform .. .."); see Hans Zeisel
& Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in
Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 491-92 (1978).
"Hunt, supra note 29, at 70, 82 ("Some lawyers assert that by the time the jury has been
chosen, the case has been decided.").
81
 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988). Section 1861 provides, in relevant part, "all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to . . . juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes... ." Id.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1988). Section 1863(b)(2) requires that each plan for selection
of jurors shall "specify whether the names of prospective jurors shall be selected from the voter
registration lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions within the district or
division .. . ." Id.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (1988). This section provides, in pertinent part:
From time to time as directed by the district court, the clerk or a district judge shall
publicly draw at random from the master jury wheel the names of as many persons
as may be required for jury service. The clerk or jury commission may, upon order
of the court, prepare an alphabetical list of the names drawn from the master jury
wheel.
Id.
34
 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a). This section provides, in part: "The clerk or jury commission shall
mail to every person whose name is drawn from the master wheel a juror qualification form
accompanied by instructions to fill out and return the form, duly signed and sworn, to the clerk
or jury commission by mail within ten days." Id.
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qualified, exempted or excused from jury service" based upon the
information provided in the qualification form." Qualified individuals,
or a smaller random sample, act as the venire—the panel of potential
jurors from which the attorneys in a case will impanel a jury."
The entire venire is subject to an examination by the judge or the
attorneys during voir dire. 38
 Voir dire provides the court and counsel
with the opportunity to examine the venire to determine which poten-
tial venirepersons should be excused." Venirepersons are excused from
the venire in two ways." First, the judge may, upon the court's own
initiative or a motion by counsel, exclude venirepersons from the
venire on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of
partiality.4 ' These challenges "for cause" are unlimited in number."
Second, counsel has a limited number of peremptory challenges
that may be exercised against individual venirepersons for almost any
reason." Traditionally, the peremptory challenge permitted each party
to excuse a limited number of venirepersons without explanation." In
35 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (5)-(6) (specifying grounds for excusing or exempting individuals from
service).
35 28 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (1988). This section provides:
The chief judge of the district, or such other district court judge ... on his initiative
or upon recommendation of the clerk or jury commission, shall determine solely
on the basis of information provided on the juror qualification form and other
competent evidence whether a person is unqualified for, or exempt, or to be
excused from jury service.
Id.
"Robert L. Harris, jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1991).
38 1 ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK § 14.7, at 182-83 (3d ed. 1993). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the court
significant discretion to control the voir dire process. See FED. R. Qv. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P.
24(a). The court may conduct the voir dire examination itself or may permit the parties to
conduct the examination of prospective jurors. FED. R. Qv. P. 47(a); FED. R. Cum. P. 24(a). If
the court conducts the examination, it shall permit the parties to supplement the examination
as the court deems proper. FED. R. Qv. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). A 1977 survey of federal
judges showed that 75% of the judges conducted the voir dire, excluding oral participation of
counsel. 5 HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATIORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY
LAW AND METHODS § 2.10, at 48 (2d ed. 1993).
39 Seel HUNTER, supra note 38, § 14.13, at 183-89.
JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION, THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF
SELECTING A JURY 143 (2d ed. 1990); 1 HUNTER, supra note 38, § 14.17, at 191.
41 1 HUNTER, supra note 88 , § 14.17, at 193.
42 Id.
45 Id. at 191-92.
44 Id. Courts generally allow counsel to exercise peremptory challenges in either of two basic
approaches. Id. at 192. In the "jury box" system, twelve jurors, chosen by lot, are placed in the
jury box. Id. The attorneys then, usually alternating between the two parties, exercise their
peremptory challenges against jurors in the jury box. Id. Each time a juror is struck, a juror is
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practice, attorneys use peremptory challenges to eliminate venirepersons
whom the attorneys believe will be least favorable to their client's case: 15
B. History of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge has an extensive history that spans
over two thousand years.46
 The Romans used it as early as 104 B.C. 47
Roman law provided that prior to a criminal trial the accuser and
accused would propose one hundred judices." Each party then could
strike fifty individuals from the other's list so that one hundred would
remain to try the alleged crime. 49
The peremptory challenge was also utilized in the early days of
the jury trial in England." Defendants in all felony trials enjoyed the
use of thirty-five peremptory challenges.5 ' In contrast, the prosecutor
had an unlimited number. 52 The survival of the peremptory challenge
over directives to eradicate it illustrates the strength of the perceived
right. Rather than strictly apply the Ordinance for Inquests," a statute
that attempted to eliminate the prosecution's peremptory challenges,"
the courts construed the statute to allow the prosecution to direct any
juror after examination to "stand aside" until the entire panel was gone
over and the defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was
a deficiency of jurors in the box at that point did the Crown have to
drawn to replace the struck juror in the jury box. Id. at 192. This process is completed when both
sides use, or waive, their allotted peremptory challenges. Id. In a "struck jury" system, in contrast,
attorneys exercise peremptory challenges against an entire venire composed of twelve individuals
plus a number of individuals equal to the combined number of peremptory challenges allotted
to each side. Id. Both parties are then permitted to exercise their peremptory challenges against
any member of the venire, resulting in a jury of twelve. Id. at 192-93.
45
 JEF'F'REY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OE THE AMERICAN JURY 43 (1987); GOBERT
JORDAN, supra note 40, at 271; SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGIMMAN, THE AMERICAN
JURY ON TRIAL.: PSYCHOLOGICAL. PERSPECTIVES 50 (1988); LAWRENCE S. WRICEITSMAN, ET Al.., IN
THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM 50 (1987); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L.
REV. 153, 168 (1989); H. Lee Sarokin & C. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury
Trial Procedures, in VERDICT 383 (Robert E. Litan, ed. 1993). Whether attorneys can actually make
such predictions is unclear. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 29, at 517 (discussion of results of
experiment in United States District Court for Northern District of Illinois).
4" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 1d.
5" Id.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 119.
52 Id.
53 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965) (citing 33 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305)).
" See id. The Ordinance provided that if "they that sue for the King will challenge any ..
Jurors, they shall assign . . . a Cause certain." Id. (citing 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305)).
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show cause in respect to jurors recalled to make up the required
number.55
The English common law provided the foundation for the use of
peremptory challenges in the American jury system. 56
 In 1790, the new
United States Congress granted thirty-five peremptories to defendants
in treason trials and twenty to defendants in trials for capital felonies
specified in the Act of 1790. 57 The common law extended the right to
peremptory challenges to defendants and the Government for crimes
not covered by the Act of 1790. 58
 Most states also carried on the
tradition of providing litigants with a number of peremptory chal-
lenges.'' By 1870, most, if not all, states provided both the prosecution
and the defense with a number of peremptory challenges. 66
C. A Controversy: Is the Peremptory Challenge Worth Saving?
Although peremptory challenges have withstood the test of time,
their continued use raises questions of equity and efficiency. 6' The
peremptory challenge system has been both criticized and praised.
Critics argue for the elimination of the peremptory challenge from the
judicial system altogether. 62
 Proponents, in contrast, argue that per-
emptory challenges contribute valuably to the judicial system. 63
Many commentators condemn the practice of allowing peremp-
tory challenges. 64
 Critics consider the peremptory challenge offensive
to our American commitment to individuality because stereotypes,
• 5 Batson, 476 U.S. at 119.
56 Swain, 380 U.S• at 214.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 214 & n.13.
59 a at 215.
6° Id. at 216. See Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Trials, 21 MARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 228-29 ti.5 (1986), and Clara L. Meek, Note, The
Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit furies in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking
Peremptory Strikes, 4 REV. LrrIG. 175, 219 (1984), for a list of the number of peremptory challenges
provided by each state in civil and criminal actions.
61 See Alschuler, supra note 45, at 208 (equity); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384
(efliciency).
62 E.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Alschuler, supra note 45, at 209;
Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384 (suggesting that abandoning peremptory challenge
system should be considered); Carl 14. Imlay, Federal Jury Relarmation: Saving a Democratic
Institution, 6 LOY, L.A. L. Rev. 247, 269 (1973); Gurney, supra note 60, at 230; Meek, supra note
60, at 215 (peremptory challenges should be eliminated in civil trials).
63
 Babcock, supra note 6, at 478-80; Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power, " 27 STAN. L. Ritv. 545, 556 (1975); William T. l'izzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease
But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. Cr. Rev. 97, 145146,
"'I E.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Alschulet; supra note 45, at 209;
Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384; Imlay, supra note 62, at 269; Gurney, supra note
60, at 230.
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hunches and even invidious distinctions provide the essence of per-
emptory challenges." A compelling reason for acting on these bases,
they argue, is difficult to conceive. 66 Moreover, the use of peremptory
challenges may compromise public confidence in the legal system. 67
Continued use, some say, promotes the notion that the composition of
the jury, not the merits of the case, governs the verdict." In addition,
allowing parties to excuse otherwise fit jurors without justification
hampers the perception that juries represent a trial by one's peers or
reflect a cross section of the community."
Commentators also make utilitarian arguments that denounce the
peremptory challenge as a waste of society's resources." Peremptory
challenges waste valuable resources by excluding otherwise qualified
jurors." Further, a retrial based upon improper juror exclusion before
the start of the original trial wastes valuable resources." The most pro-
found expenses, however, are the accumulated administrative costs."
In contrast, many commentators believe that the peremptory chal-
lenge has value and merits retention. 74
 The Supreme Court has called
peremptory challenges one of the most important rights secured to an
accused individual." Its extensive history is unquestionable.76 The right
to trial by jury serves as a safeguard against a corrupt or overzealous
65 Pizzi, supra note 63, at 144 (discussing proponents' bases for abolishing peremptory
challenges); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 383; see Alschuler, supra note 45, at
199-201.
66
 Alschuler, supra note 45, at 202.
67
 See Pizzi, supra note 63, at 144 (discussing proponents' bases for abolishing peremptory
challenges); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384.
68 Pizzi, supra note 63, at 144.
69 Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384.
" Pizzi, supra note 63, at 145 (discussing proponents' bases for abolishing peremptory
challenges); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384.
Pizzi, supra note 63, at 145 (discussing proponents' bases for abolishing peremptory
challenges); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 384.
Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 45, at 383.
" Id. at 384, Sarokin & Munsterman note:
In federal court, at least sixteen jurors may be called and excused in criminal cases,
and at least six in most civil cases. Many more may be challenged in multidefendant
cases, both criminal and civil. Multiply that number in every court throughout the
country by the number of trials, and the total of those peremptorily challenged and
thus excluded from service is staggering. Each prospective juror must spend at least
a day in court, be paid the required fee, and lose the equivalent amount of
productive work time. This process involves thousands of people and millions of
dollars each year.
Id.
74 Babcock, supra note 6, at 478-80; Babcock, supra note 63, at 556; Pizzi, supra note 63, at
145-46.
75 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
"See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the peremptory chal-
lenge's extensive history.
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prosecutor and against a compliant, biased or eccentric judge." Per-
emptories act as a further safeguard by allowing litigants to participate
in the selection of the jury. 78 According to some commentators, the
continued existence of the peremptory challenge also encourages ef-
fective voir dire questioning because attorneys need not fear antago-
nizing a juror—the attorney can use a peremptory to exclude such a
juror.79 Further, pressures on the judiciary to clear an already overbur-
dened docket often force courts to provide limited attention to voir
dire questioning. 80 Restrained scrutiny of potential juror bias heightens
the need for peremptory challenges. 8 '
One commentator has called peremptory challenges a hedge against
an unlucky spin of the jury selection wheel that sometimes results in
a significantly biased jury. 82 Eliminating the extremes of a jury also
helps to eliminate the occurrence of hung juries." Unless a juror
admits bias or prejudice during voir dire examination, the court must
seek alternative grounds for excusing the individual for cause.84
Proponents also argue that peremptories provide the parties, es-
pecially criminal defendants, with the feeling that the jury is a fair and
impartial panel,85 thus promoting the appearance of justice. 86 The
courts seek to assure society and litigants of the fairness of the system
through the appearance of justice. 87 These proponents thus contend
that appearances are as important as reality.
H. How DID WE GET TO GENDER? THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Pre-Batson Cases
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed, for over a century,
that racial discrimination in jury selection by the state violates the
"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
78 Babcock, supra note 6, at 479.
78 Id.
8eRobert G. Morvillo, Peremptory Challenges and Use of Batson, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 7, 1993, at 3;
see Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial juror in an Age of Mass Media!, 40
Am. U. L. REV. 631, 653 (1991).
Ell Morvillo, supra note 80, at 3.
82 Pizzi, supra note 63, at 145-46.
83 Id. at 145.
"See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Pizzi,
supra note 63, at 146.
85 Babcock, supra note 63, at 552.
66 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 200, 219 (1965).
87
 Babcock, supra note 63, at 552.
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United States Constitution. 88 The Court first enunciated this principle
in 1880, in Strauder v. West Virginia. 89 The Strauder Court construed
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to guaran-
tee the right of criminal defendants to trials by juries composed of
citizens chosen without regard to race.° Strauder was an African Amer-
ican man indicted and convicted for murder.9 ' Prior to commence-
ment of the indictment, the defendant moved to remove the case from
a West Virginia state court to a United States circuit court.92 Strauder
argued that the trial in West Virginia state court denied him equal
protection of the laws because the state prohibited members of his race
from sitting on juries 9S The trial court, however, denied the motion.94
Strauder appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court, which affirmed
the trial court's opinion.95 Finally, upon a writ of error, the United
States Supreme Court considered the issue.°
The Court, holding West Virginia's statutory exclusion of African-
Americans from jury service unconstitutional, reasoned that the then
newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment required "that the law in the
States shall be the same for the black as for the white."'" Further,
according to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to
assure that African-Americans enjoyed civil rights equally with white in-
dividuals.98 The West Virginia law that prohibited African-Americans from
sitting on juries, therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 The
Court concluded that compelling an individual to submit to a trial by
a jury drawn from a panel that excluded otherwise qualified African-
Americans, merely because of race, amounts to a pellucid denial of
equal protection.m Thus, after Strauder, states could not openly pro-
hibit members of certain races from the array of prospective jurors. ] °l
"8 See, e.g., Bautou v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04; Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
89 100 U.S. at 310.
9° Id.
91 Id. at 309.
92 Id.
93 Id. West Virginia law only allowed white men to sit on juries in state judicial proceedings.
Id.
94 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
915 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 307, 310.
98 Id. at 306.
99 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
1 °° Id. at 309.
1 ° 1 See id. at 310. Note that various other means of racial discrimination remained available;
for example, peremptory challenges, change of venue, education requirements and freehold
requirements. See id.
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In 1965, eighty-five years after Strauder, the United States Supreme
Court, in Swain v. Alabama, set a stringent burden of proof for liti-
gants seeking to show racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges.' 02 The Court held that the use of peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors of a particular race did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause except upon proof that exclusion of individuals of that race from
juries occurred over a number of cases, such that no member of that
race ever served on a jury in that district." Thus, a defendant could
not show discriminatory use of peremptory challenges based upon the
actions of counsel in the defendant's trial alone. 1 °4
An all-white jury convicted Robert Swain, an African-American
defendant, of rape." An Alabama state court sentenced him to death." ['
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the prosecution's exercise
of its peremptory challenges to strike each of the six African-American
venirepersons violated the Equal Protection Clause.'" The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.'" 8 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.m9
The Court initially noted that a state's purposeful or deliberate
exclusion of African-Americans from participation as jurors violates the
Equal Protection Clause."' Recognizing that defendants are not enti-
tled to a jury containing members of the defendant's race, the Court
maintained that jurors must be selected as individuals, on individual
characteristics, not as members of a particular race. 11'I Finally, the Court
stated that these principles apply to any identifiable group which "may
be the subject of prejudice." 112
After surveying the extensive historyi's and function of the per-
emptory challenge," 4 the Court held that the facts of the case did not
establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'' The Swain Court
explained that the quest for an impartial and qualified jury exposes
1°2 '380 U.S. 202,223-24 (1965).
103 /d.
1 °4 See id.
105 Id. at 203,205.
106 Id, at 203.
1 °7
 Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-05.
1 °8 1d. at 203.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 203-04.
111M.
112 Swain, 380 U.S. at 204-05.
"3 /d. at '212-19. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history
behind the peremptory challenge.
114 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-21. See discussion of proponents of peremptory challenges supra
notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
115 Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
172	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:161
individuals of all races and religions to the peremptory challenge. 116
Subjecting a prosecutor's peremptory challenge to equal protection
scrutiny, the Court stated, would alter the essence of peremptory chal-
lenges such that they would no longer be peremptory.'" The Court
concluded that, in light of the purpose and function of peremptory
challenges, the presumption must be that in an individual case a
prosecutor used the state's peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and
impartial jury." 8 The Court did, however, recognize a cause of action
when a state systematically, in case after case, used peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude members of a particular race from juries, effectively
preventing members of that race from ever serving on juries." 9 Thus,
after Swain, a defendant could not show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause due to race-based peremptory strikes in a particular
case.'" Rather, the Court required evidence of systematic exclusion of
a particular race from juries over a number of cases.' 21
B. Batson v. Kentucky
The burden of proof established in Swain proved almost insur-
mountable for defendants.' 22 In 1986, the Supreme Court, in Batson v.
Kentucky, rejected the evidentiary formulation developed in Swain.'"
The Batson Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
prosecutor from utilizing a peremptory challenge against a juror solely
on account of the juror's race or on the assumption that the juror is
not able to impartially consider the case because of the juror's race. 124
A Kentucky grand jury indicted Mr. Batson, an African-American
man, on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.' 25 At trial, the
judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire and excused
certain jurors for cause. 128 The prosecutor then exercised his peremp-
tory challenges to select an all-white jury by striking the four African-
American jurors on the panel.'" The defendant moved to discharge
" 6 Id.
117 1d. at 221-22.
115 Id. at 222.
" Id. at 223-24.
126 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
121 See id.
122 Meek, supra note 60, at 182 & n.31 (extensive list of cases failing to overcome Swain
burden, noting only two successful cases).
123 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986).
124 1d. at 89.
125 1d. at 82.
126 1d.
' 27 1d. at 83.
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the jury before it was sworn, claiming that the removal of the African-
American jurors violated his right to equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Arnendment.' 26 The defendant requested a hearing on
the motion. 129 The judge, however, denied the motion without a hear-
ing, observing that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory
challenges to "strike anybody they want to."'" The trial was held and
the jury convicted the defendant on both counts."' The Supreme
Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial court's ruling, rejecting the de-
fendant's argument that the peremptory challenge violated his rights
under the Sixth Amendment.' 32
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court repudiated the Swain
evidentiary procedure that required a showing of discriminatory strik-
ing of African-Americans over a series of cases to demonstrate a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.'" Batson established a new proce-
dure for determining when a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 134
The Court concluded that a defendant could establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury based
solely upon evidence gathered during the defendant's trial.'" The
prima facie case would create an inference that the prosecution exer-
cised its peremptory challenges to exclude a venireperson because of
the venireperson's race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 36
To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must show that he or
she belongs to a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor exercised
128 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
129 Id.
"13 1d.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 83-84. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that	 all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...." (emphasis added). U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Although Batson based his objections on the Sixth Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court decided the case based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112-13 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The United States Supreme
Court rejected the Sixth Amendment argument in 1990, in Holland v. Illinois, holding that the
Sixth Amendment "no more forbids the prosecutor to strike jurors on the basis of race than it
forbids him to strike them on innumerable other generalized characteristics," 493 U.S. 474, 487
(1990). Thus, after Holland, the only cause of action for race-based peremptory strikes recognized
by the United States Supreme Court falls under Batson. See id.
183 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
154 Id. at 96-98. The Court explained that cases subsequent to Swain altered the proper
procedure in an equal protection case and therefore warranted an adjustment of the procedure
required by Swain. See id. at 95.
13.3 1d. at 96.
1S6
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peremptory challenges to remove venirepersons of the defendant's
race and that these facts, and "other relevant circumstances," raise an
inference that the prosecutor has discriminated purposefully. 137
The establishment of a prima facie case then shifts the burden to
the prosecutor to proffer a race-neutral explanation for the peremp-
tory challenge.'" The Court emphasized that, although it was limiting
the historically silent nature of the peremptory challenge to some
degree by requiring the prosecutor to put forth a justification, the
justification need not rise to the level required by a "challenge for
cause."1" The prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related
to the particular case being tried."° Thus, a facial denial of a racial
motivation or an affirmation of good faith, without more, would be
insufficient."'
The trial court then considers the justification proffered by the
prosecution to determine if the defendant has shown that the prose-
cution impermissibly utilized a peremptory challenge to eliminate a
juror based upon race.'" The Court declined to formulate more spe-
cific procedures, however, because of the different jury selection prac-
tices used in the various state and federal trial courts. 145 Thus, the Court
left the procedural details for the lower courts to determine.' 44
Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion lauding the decision
as "a historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial
discrimination in the selection of juries." 145 He did not, however, be-
lieve that the decision would actually eliminate such discrimination
entirely.' 40 Justice Marshall proposed that nothing short of complete
elimination of the peremptory challenge would end the racial discrimi-
nation that stems from the peremptory challenge process."'
Justice Marshall argued that the process set out by the Court would
not end the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.' 48 First, Jus-
tice Marshall argued that the defendants could not attack the prose-
cutor's use of the peremptory challenges unless the challenges were
137 Id. The Court did not clarify what other circumstances are relevant. See id.
138
 Batson, 476 U.S at 97.
1" Id.
140 Id. at 98.
141 1d.
1421d .
143 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24.
144 Id.
145 1d. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
148 M. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
147 1d. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
148 Bats,„ 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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flagrant enough to establish a prima facie case.'" According to Justice
Marshall, if a jury panel does not include many minority members,
then the prosecutor will find it easier to strike those minority members
because the court will allow a few strikes before it gets suspicious.'"
Thus, Justice Marshall argued, discrimination is permitted if it is held
to an "acceptable" level." 51
Second, Justice Marshall maintained that prosecutors may easily
advance facially neutral reasons for striking a juror as pretext for
discriminatory intent.'52 Trial courts, he argued, are ill-equipped to
ferret out true discriminatory intent.'" Justice Marshall questioned
how a trial court should deal with neutral justifications, such as: "the
juror had a son about the same age as [the] defendant"; "[the juror]
seemed 'uncommunicative"; or "[the juror] 'never cracked a smile'
and therefore 'did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically
look at the issues and decide the facts in this case." 154 Justice Marshall
feared that trial courts would find such easily generated explanations
sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's burden, rendering the protec-
tions guaranteed by the majority opinion illusory.'"
Third, Justice Marshall also feared that racism would seep into the
process through the prosecutor's or judge's subconscious mind.' 56 Ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, conscious or unconscious racism may lead
the prosecutor to characterize a prospective African-American juror as
sullen or distant, a characterization that would not have come to mind
if a white juror had acted in the same manner.'" Racism, Justice
Marshall noted, remains a fact of life in society as a whole and in the
administration of justice since the Civil War.'"
Stressing the conflict between the Equal Protection Clause and
the peremptory challenge system, Justice Marshall concluded that only
the complete elimination of the peremptory challenge from the crimi-
nal justice system would eradicate the racially discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge.'" The Constitution guarantees all persons equal
149 Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
• ra' See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
151 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, of course, intended the use of "acceptable"
as a quip. See id.
15'2
	 at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
155 liaison, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
154
	 (Marshall, J., concurring).
155 Id. (Marshall, j., concurring).
156 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
158 Raison, 476 U.S. at 106-07 (Marshall, J., concurring).
I ti9 Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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protection of the laws.' 6° Justice Marshall argued, however, that so long
as the peremptory challenge exists, the constitutional mandate cannot
be fulfilled.' 61 Justice Marshall concluded that the Court must com-
pletely prohibit the use of peremptory challenges because they conflict
with the Equal Protection Clause and are not a constitutionally guar-
anteed right. 162 The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws, he argued, must prevail over statutorily and judicially created
righ ts. 163
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist," filed a dissent-
ing opinion that criticized the majority for setting aside a "procedure
which has been part of the common law for many centuries and part
of our jury system for nearly 200 years." 65 The peremptory challenge,
he noted, has been in use for nearly as long as juries have existed, and
performs a valuable function within the system. 166 Further, ChiefJustice
Burger criticized the majority for limiting peremptory challenges when
the very nature of the challenge is based upon limited information,
hunches, intuition and stereotypes.' 67 Thus, Burger argued, equal pro-
tection analysis is simply inapplicable to the inherently capricious na-
ture of the peremptory challenge. 168
The dissenting opinion also criticized the majority for misapplying
the Equal Protection Clause, as Batson was clearly limited to race.'"
True equal protection analysis would, Burger argued, apply to various
other categories including, among others, mental capacity, religious
affiliation, living arrangements and age.'" Burger also believed that
160 U.S. CoNs.r. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall , deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CoNs`r. amend. V ("No person shall be . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law • .").
161 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
164Justice Rehnquist also filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
that generally criticized the majority opinion's dismantling of Swain. Id. at 134 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
166 /d. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority for
deciding the case on Fourteenth Amendment grounds when the Court granted certiorari to
decide the case on Sixth Amendment grounds. Id. at 112-13 (Burger, CI, dissenting). The Court
"granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner was tried 'in violation of constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons representing a fair
cross section of the community.'" Id. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting petition for cert.
at i, No. 84-6263 (Feb. 19, 1985)). The Chief Justice then addressed the equal protection issue
because the majority decided the case on those grounds. Id. at 118 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
166 Batson, 476 U.S. at 120-21 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
167 Id. at 123 (Burger, C.", dissenting).
166 Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
166 Id. at 123-24 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
170 Id. at 124 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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the majority had, paradoxically, interjected racial matters into the jury
selection process contrary to the thrust of the long line of cases. 171 He
predicted that attorneys would probe deeply into the racial backgrounds
and national origins of potential jurors to build records for prima facie
cases and rebuttal.'" Such probing, Burger noted, may offend some
potential jurors."s In addition, according to Chief Justice Burger, it is
often difficult to determine or even define one's race. 174 To compound
these problems, Burger concluded, the majority "essentially wishes
[the] judges well" without much more because of its failure to provide
significant guidance to the trial courts that must implement the deci-
sion.'"
The Batson Court, therefore, held that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids a prosecutor from utilizing a peremptory challenge against a
venireperson because of the venireperson's race)" The Court set out
a three-pronged burden-shifting scheme for allegations of impermissi-
ble peremptory challenges. 177 This decision rejected the evidentiary
formulation developed in Swain.' 78
C. Batson 's Progeny
The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided several
cases that extended Batson, providing symmetry to its application in
the courtroom.'" In a 1991 decision, Powers v. Ohio, the Court held
that a criminal defendant has standing to raise an equal protection
claim on behalf of a potential juror excluded in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause even when the defendant and the juror do not share
the same race.' 8° Several months later, the Court, in Edmonson v. Lees-
171 Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
172 1d. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
175 1d. (Burger, GI, dissenting).
174 1d. at 130 n.10 (Burger, CI, dissenting).
176 1d. at 130-31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
176 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
177 1d. at 96-98.
178 1d. at 92-93.
179 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353, 2359 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991).
180 111 S. Ct. at 1373. The Court reversed the Ohio Court of Appeals' finding that because
he did not share the same race as the struck jurors, the white defendant was not entitled to make
out a prima facie case of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for the race-based removal of seven African-American jurors. See id. at 1366, 1374. The Court
reasoned that whether the defendant and the challenged juror share the same race is irrelevant.
Id. at 1373. The Court concluded that extending standing to a criminal defendant to raise the
equal protection rights of a juror excluded from service was proper because: (1) the defendant
would suffer a cognizable injury; (2) the defendant shared interests with the juror in preventing
unconstitutional peremptory strikes; and (3) the juror's ability to protect his or her own interests
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ville Concrete Co., extended the Batson line to civil trials. 18 ' Finally, in
1992, the Court held, in Georgia v. McCollum, that, in addition to
prosecutors, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also prohibits criminal defendants from using peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate potential jurors based on the juror's race. 182
The only United States Supreme Court case to address, in depth,
the evidentiary burdens required by Batson is the 1991 decision, Her-
nandez v. New York.'" The Hernandez Court declined to find that per-
emptory strikes that have a disparate impact on certain racial groups
are invalid per se.'" Rather, the Court held that absent inherent dis-
was hindered. Id. at 1370-73. The Court first concluded that the defendant would be injured by
the exclusion of a juror based upon the juror's race because the overt discrimination casts doubt
over the obligations of all involved with the trial to adhere to the law throughout the trial. Id. at
1371-72. The Court explained that because the voir dire is the jury's first introduction to the
trial process, any irregularities may taint the entire trial. Id. Thus, impropriety in selecting a jury
may injure the defendant's opportunity for an unbiased jury because it casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process and the criminal proceeding at hand. See id. Second, the nature
of the jury trial establishes a common interest between the jurors and the defendant to eliminate
discrimination from the courtroom. Id. at 1372. The defendant, as well, is sure to vigorously
advocate the excluded juror's rights by virtue of the common interest. Id. Finally, the Court found
that excluded jurors rarely will bring suit if they are excluded based on their race because, among
other things, the juror will rarely possess the incentive to pursue the claim. Id. at 1372-73.
181 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081, 2088 (1991). Reversing an en bane ruling of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that private litigants in civil cases may not use
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race. Id. at 2080, 2081, 2088.
Edmonson, a construction worker, sued Leesville Concrete Co. for negligence in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Id. at 2080. Edmonson claimed that one of
Leesville's workers allowed a truck to roll backward, pinning the plaintiff against some construc-
tion equipment. Id. At trial, defense counsel used two of its three peremptory challenges permit-
ted by 28 U.S.C. § 1870 to remove African-Americans from the potential jury. Id. at 2081.
Edmonson, also an African-American, requested that the district court require Leesville to articu-
late a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strikes of the two African-American jurors. Id.
The district court, however, rejected the request on the ground that Batson does not apply to
civil proceedings. Id. The jury, composed of one African-American and eleven white jurors,
rendered a verdict for Edmonson for damages of only $18,000. Id. A divided en bane panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
concluding that the use of peremptory challenges by private litigants does not constitute state
action and, as a result, does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
182 1 1 2 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992). The decision relied on Edmonson and Powers to support the
Court's reasoning. Id. at 2354-58. The Court found, as in Edmonson, that a private party, namely
a criminal defendant, is a state actor. Id. at 2354-57. Furthermore, the majority, using the same
reasoning as Powers, found that the State has standing to object to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant. Id. at 2357. The Court also addressed the
concern that a criminal defendant's rights overcome the interests served by Batson. Id. at 2357-58.
The Court, however, concluded that the constitutional requirement outlined in Batson must
necessarily overcome the state-created right to peremptory challenges. See id. at 2358. The Court
noted that "Lilt is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate
against a group of citizens based upon their race." Id.
1 tl"111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866-70 (1991).
184 Id. at 1867.
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criminatory intent in the proffered justification, facial neutrality alone
rebuts a prima facie case of racially discriminatory use of a peremptory
challenge. 185 Thus, the Court declined to automatically infer discrimi-
natory intent merely because striking Spanish-speaking jurors may
disproportionately impact Latino jurors: 86 The Court concluded that
trial courts may accept facially race-neutral explanations regardless of
the actual impact upon jurors: 87 Subsequent to Hernandez, therefore,
a party may rebut a prima facie case of discriminatory use of a peremp-
tory challenge by asserting a facially race-neutral explanation.' 88 The
trial court may, however, find the explanation inadequate if it deter-
mines that discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation.' 88
A New York state trial court convicted the defendant, Hernandez,
on two counts of attempted murder and two counts of criminal pos-
session of a weapon for firing several shots at a woman and her mother,
hitting one and missing the other.' 9° Stray bullets from the defendant's
gun also injured two men in a nearby restaurant.' 81 At trial, after
sixty-three potential jurors had been questioned and nine impaneled,
defense counsel objected to two of the prosecution's peremptory chal-
leriges.' 92 The defendant argued that the prosecution used the peremp-
tory challenges to exclude the two jurors on account of their Latino
heritage.'" The prosecutor, without waiting for a ruling on whether
the defendant had adequately made a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination, argued that he utilized the peremptory challenges be-
cause he was uncertain that these jurors could follow the official trans-
lation of the testimony of several Spanish-speaking witnesses.'" He
explained that when he asked these Spanish-speaking jurors if they
could accept the interpreter's translation of the Spanish-speaking wit-
nesses, "Et] hey each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy
that they would try, not that they could, but that they would try to
follow the interpreter, and I feel that in a case where the interpreter
will he for the main witnesses, they would have an undue impact upon
the jury."'" Further, the prosecutor explained that he would have no
motive to exclude the jurors because all the complainants and the
185 /d. at 1866.
186 1d. at 1867.
187 Id.
1 " Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.
189 Id.
19° Id. at 1864.
191 Id.
192 Id.
198 Hernando, 111 S. Ct. at 1864.
194 Id. at 1864-65.
195 Id. at 1865.
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prosecution's civilian witnesses were Hispanic.'" The court ultimately
rejected the defendant's Batson claim.'97 On appeal, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the prosecution had offered race-neutral explanations for the
peremptory strikes sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case. 198
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court's ruling.'
Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Souter. 2" The plurality observed
that under Batson, a court, when evaluating the neutrality of a prose-
cutor's proffered explanation, must determine whether the explana-
tion violates the Equal Protection Clause as both a matter of law and
of fact.201 The plurality stressed that a Batson violation requires proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 202 The Court refused to
infer intent, as a matter of law, from a showing of disproportionate
impact on a particular racial group. 21" Thus, a mere showing of a
disproportionate impact on a particular racial group is not sufficient
to support a finding of an Equal Protection violation. 2" The trial court
may, however, consider a showing of disproportionate impact as evi-
dence that the proffered race-neutral explanation constitutes a pretext
for racial discrimination. 2°5
The plurality reasoned that the prosecutor's explanation consti-
tuted a race-neutral justification for his peremptory strikes. 2" The
Court noted that the challenges neither rested on the intention to
exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions
about Latinos or bilinguals. 207 Rather, the prosecutor sought to elimi-
nate only those whose conduct during voir dire persuaded him that
they might have difficulty in accepting the interpreter's translation of
the Spanish-language testimony.208 The plurality also noted that this
196 Id.
197 Id.
1" Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865.
199 Id.
2%1 Id. at 1864. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment in a
separate opinion because she believed that the plurality opinion went farther than necessary in
order to assess the constitutionality of the prosecutor's asserted justification. Id. at 1873 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 1866-68.
Y02 Id. at 1866.
2°3 Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1867.
2°4 Id.
205 Id. at 1868.
2°6 Id. at 1867.
2°7 Id.
Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
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category of jurors would include both Latinos and non-Latinos. 209 Thus,
although the prosecutor's criterion may result in a disproportionate
removal of Latinos from the jury, disproportionate impact alone does
not constitute a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 21 U
The trial court retained the duty to determine whether the prose-
cutor proffered a facially race-neutral explanation rebutting the defen-
dant's prima facie claim of an Equal Protection Clause violation. 211 The
trial court could properly consider the disproportionate exclusion of
members of a certain race as evidence that the proffered explanation
was merely a pretext for racial discrimination. 212 The trial judge could
also consider other factors, such as a refusal to employ valid alterna-
tives to the exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors. 213 The trial court
could, for example, determine that a prosecutor's persistence in the
desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors despite reasonable alterna-
tives, such as a discreet way for jurors to advise the judge of concerns
with the translation during the course of the trial, was evidence of
pretext.214
The plurality observed that the trial court's ruling must receive
great deference on appeal because the determination largely turns on
an evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility. 215 The plurality explained
that in the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question
is whether the attorney's race-neutral justification is credible. 216 Evi-
dence bearing on the issue of the attorney's credibility will rarely
extend beyond an evaluation of the attorney's demeanor.217 The plu-
rality noted that an evaluation of the state of mind of the attorney
based upon demeanor and credibility "lies peculiarly within a trial
judge's province."218 Thus, the plurality refused to overturn the trial
court's finding because the trial court did not commit clear error in
choosing to believe the reasons given by the prosecutor. 219
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun,
dissented. 220 Justice Stevens did not agree that the prosecutor dispelled
"9 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1868; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
212 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
218 Id.
214 1d.
115 Id. at 1869 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21).
216 1d.
217 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1869.
218 1d.
219 a at 1873.
"°Id. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun dissented, agreeing with Justice
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the inference that he had discriminated against the challenged jurors
based on their race.221 Justice Stevens argued that the Court erred by
focusing the entire inquiry on the prosecutor's subjective state of
mind.222 He contended that the Court obligated the defendant to
generate evidence of the prosecutor's actual subjective intent to dis-
criminate by requiring the prosecutor's explanation to provide addi-
tional, direct evidence of discriminatory motive. 226 He would allow, in
contrast to the plurality, a showing of disproportionate impact to stand
as evidence that would require a rejection of the facially neutral expla-
nation as a matter of law. 224
Justice Stevens identified three reasons that, when considered
together, should have rendered the race-neutral justification insuf-
ficient to overcome the prima facie case of race discrimination. 225 First,
the justification would inevitably result in a disproportionate impact
upon Spanish-speaking jurors and thus was merely a proxy for a dis-
criminatory purpose. 226 Second, less drastic means of dealing with the
prosecutor's concerns existed. 227 Finally, if the prosecutor's concern
were valid, it could have been properly dealt with as a challenge for
cause. 228
The Court has provided extensively for symmetrical application of
Batson through several decisions following that seminal case. 229 Batson
now applies to all parties in civil and criminal trials.'" But for Hernan-
dez and a few words in Batson, however, the Court has not provided
the trial courts with much guidance to implement Batson's broad
dictates. 251
D. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.: Gender, Like Race, Is an
Unconstitutional Proxy
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1994 decision J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB., extended Batson to cover gender, in addition to
Stevens' argument that the prosecutor had not rebutted the defendant's prima fade case. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224 1d. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225 Id, at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223 See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
23° Id.
231 See supra notes 135-44,201-18 and accompanying text.
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race.232 The Court held that intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender in the exercise of a peremptory challenge violates the Equal
Protection Clause.2" Thus, the three-pronged analysis established for
race, in Batson, now applies to peremptory challenges based upon a
prospective juror's gender. 234
The State of Alabama filed a complaint in District Court in Jackson
County, Alabama, on behalf of a mother named T.B., for paternity and
child support against the alleged father, J.E.B.233 During jury selection,
the district court excused two males and one female for cause from a
panel that originally consisted of twelve males and twenty-four fe-
males.236 The State subsequently used nine of its ten peremptory chal-
lenges to excuse male jurors. 237 Likewise, J.E.B. used all but one of his
strikes against female panel members." The remaining jurors were all
female. 239 Drawing on the logic and reasoning of Batson,J.E.B. objected
that the State peremptorily challenged potential jurors solely on the
basis of their gender and, thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2" The court rejected J.E.B.'s claim and
impaneled the all-female juryY41 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found that J.E.B. was the father of T.B.'s child. 242 The court ordered
him to pay child support. 243 On a post-judgment motion by J.E.B., the
court reaffirmed its ruling that Batson did not extend to gender-based
peremptory challenges. 244 The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affir-
med and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. 246 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle a split in both
state and federal authority. 246
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg. 247 The majority opinion in-
itially noted that gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges is a "relatively recent phenomenon" because many states
232J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S, Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1429-30.
235 1d. at 1421.
2s6
237 JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
238 Id.
239 Id.
249 Id.
241 Id.
2421E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
243 Id.
244 Id.
243 Id.
248 Id. at 1422 &IL]; see supra note 13.
x47 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421,
184	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 36:161
excluded women from jury service well into the present century. 248
Moreover, the majority recounted, many of those states that permitted
women to serve erected barriers such as registration requirements and
automatic exemptions to deter women from actually serving. 249 The
Court observed, however, that it has already determined that such
barriers are unconstitutiona1. 25°
Recognizing that the Court has consistently subjected gender-
based classifications to heightened judicial scrutiny, the majority opin-
ion rejected Alabama's argument 'that it could discriminate on the
basis of gender and not race in the selection of the petit jury because
gender discrimination has never reached the level of discrimination
against African-Americans. 25 ' The majority declined to determine
whether women or racial minorities have suffered more discrimination
by state actors. 252 Given that the United States has a long history of gender
discrimination, the majority determined that gender-based classifica-
tions require "an exceedingly persuasive justification."255 Thus, the ma-
jority determined, "the only question is whether discrimination on the
basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the State's legiti-
mate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial."254
The Court concluded that invidious discrimination based on gen-
der or race causes harm to litigants, jurors and the community. 255 The
risk that race-based or gender-based prejudice motivating the discrimi-
natory selection of jurors will "infect" the judicial proceedings harms
the litigants, 256 Moreover, the majority explained, wrongful exclusion
from participation in the judicial process as jurors harms potential
jurors, and the State's role in the perpetuation of invidious stereotypes
harms the community. 257 Finally, the appearance of state-sanctioned
discrimination in the courtroom harms the public's confidence in the
judicial system. 255
The majority opinion warned that the extension of Batson to
gender neither implies the elimination of peremptory challenges alto-
245 Id. at 1422-23. The exclusion of women from jury service is traced from the English
common law "doctrine of frropter defectum sexus, literally, the 'defect of sex.'" Id. at 1423.
249 Id. at 1423,
25° Id. at 1424.
251 Id. at 1424-25.
252 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
259 Id.
254 Id.
255
 Id. at 1427.
255 Id.
257 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
258 Id.
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gether, nor conflicts with a State's legitimate interest in using peremp-
tory challenges to secure fair and impartial juries.'" The majority
reasoned that litigants still may remove potential jurors whom the
litigants feel are less acceptable than the other venire members.'"
Gender, the Court noted, "simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." 26 '
Thus, according to the Court, litigants may continue to exclude any
class or group normally subject to a rational basis review. 262
 The Court
also noted that absent a showing of pretext, peremptory strikes based
upon characteristics disproportionately associated with a particular
gender may be appropriate.265
 For example, although challenging all
the nurses may disproportionately affect women in the venire and,
likewise, challenging all military veterans may disproportionately affect
men in the venire, such challenges remain constitutional unless gen-
der-based.'"
In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
wrote a concurring opinion to discuss the costs of extending Batson to
gender. 265
 O'Connor asserted that extending Batson to gender places
an additional burden on the state and federal judicial systems, 266 pushes
the Court a step closer to eliminating the peremptory challenge and
decreases the ability of litigants to act on "sometimes accurate gender-
based assumptions about juror attitudes." 267
 justice O'Connor warned
that as the Court adds constitutional restraints, the use of the peremp-
25° Id. at 1429.
26° Id.
261 Id.
262JEB., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (citing Lark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 452, 439-42 (1985)).
265 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
264 Id.
265
 Id. at 1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also reaffirmed her position that
the Equal Protection Clause does not limit the exercise of peremptory challenges by private civil
litigants and criminal defendants. Id. at 1432-33; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,
2361 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct 2077, 2089 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (private civil litigants). Keeping with
her dissenting opinions in Edmonson and McCollum, O'Connor argued that the Court should
limit J.E.B. to the Government's use of gender-based peremptory challenges because private
litigants and criminal defendants are not state actors. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J„
concurring); McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criminal defen-
dants); Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (private civil litigants).
Ns LER, 114 S. Ct. at 1431. Justice O'Connor observed that Bat= "mini-hearings" are
routine in both state and federal trial courts. Id. O'Connor also highlighted the proliferation of
Batson appeals. Id. Thus, she indicated, J.E.B. may have a more significant impact than Batson
because women represent a larger portion of society than do racial minorities. See id.
267 1d. at 1432.
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tory challenge becomes less discretionary and more like a challenge
for cause.268
Justice Scalia, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
filed a dissenting opinion.'" Initially, Justice Scalia criticized the ma-
jority for its discussion of the historical exclusion of women from jury
service and the bar.'" He believed the discussion "irrelevant" because the
case involved alleged discrimination against male jurors, not women. 27 t
Moreover, Scalia noted, neither party contested that gender discrimi-
nation is subject to a heightened scrutiny analysis. 272
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
peremptory challenges on the basis of any group characteristic subject
to heightened scrutiny violate the Equal Protection Clause.'" He ar-
gued that the majority's conclusion is reached only by focusing on
individual exercises of the peremptory challenge. 2'4 When the practice
is considered in totality, he argued, it is difficult to find a violation of
equal protection because all groups are subject to the peremptory
challenge.'" He conceded that systematic exclusion of a particular
class, such that the "strikes evinced group-based animus and served as
a proxy for segregated venire lists," would constitute a violation of
equal protection.'" He observed, however, that the litigants in J.E.B.
exercised their peremptory challenges to assemble a jury favorably
disposed to its case, not to discriminate against a particular gender.'"
Justice Scalia also criticized the broad effect of the majority's
reasoning. 278 He argued that the majority's reasoning implies that gen-
der-based strikes do not even meet a rational basis review, placing all
peremptory strikes based on group characteristics at risk.'" Thus, he
questioned how the majority's standard will develop over time.'"
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by stating that the Batson line
of cases has inflicted damage upon both the peremptory system and
the entire justice system. 281 The peremptory challenge, he stated, loses
268 Id. at 1431.
269 /d. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271 .J.E.B„ 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 1d. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273 /d. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276j.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277 Id. (Scalia, I, dissenting).
278 Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438-39.
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its "whole character" when one must provide reasons for its use.'" He
further posited that not even expanded voir dire could substitute for
this loss, although he believes such expansion is now inevitable.'"
Scalia concluded that the burden of lengthy collateral litigation pur-
suant to Batson and its progeny and the lengthening of the voir dire
process harm the justice system. 284
The J.E.B. decision marks the extension of the reasoning and
holding of Batson to gender.285 The Court held in J.E.B. that gender-
based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. 2B"
Thus, attorneys may.no longer legally exercise a peremptory challenge
on the basis of gender. 287
III, ILLUSORY PROTECTION?
Batson and its progeny require trial attorneys to justify their use
of a peremptory challenge if opposing counsel makes a prima facie
case alleging race-based use of the challenge. 288 This requirement has,
in effect, converted the peremptory challenge into a "quasi-peremp-
tory challenge," at least when the race of the challenged juror may be
the basis for the challenge. 289 Courts, however, often accept vague or
subjective explanations to overcome prima facie cases of race-based
peremptory challenges, 29° The courts' acceptance of such explanations
prompted one commentator to conclude that "with a thorough work-
ing knowledge of the decisional law in the area and an attentive eye
and ear, experienced trial counsel should be able to readily justify their
actions."29 ' Indeed, this seems to be the often unspoken truth govern-
ing prohibited peremptory strikes.202
 The current application of Batson
282 /d. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288 /d. at 1421.
"9.f.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
21/7 Id.
298 See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
288 Alschuler, supra note 95, at 200, Professor Alschuler coined the phrase "quasi-peremptory
challenge" to describe a challenge that requires some explanation but neither full justification
nor cause. Id.
29(1 See infra notes 303-20 and accompanying text. A federal trial handbook lists a 31 point
checklist of race-neutral reasons held to justify the use of peremptory challenges in federal
appellate courts. 2 HUNTER, supra note 38, § 15.21, at 273-75. This list provides a clear example
of various race-neutral explanations that federal appellate courts deemed appropriate. Id.
291 Steven M. Puiszis, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will the Peremptory Challenge
Survive Its Battle With the Equal Protection Clause?, 251 MARSHALL L. REV. 37, 80 (1991).
292
 Eg„ SAROKIN & MUNSTERMAN, supra note 45, at 383 ("We respectfully submit that [Batson]
will not end the objectionable practices but will merely compel lawyers to be more creative in
finding reasons for excluding potential jurors. The only change will be the improved ingenuity
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verifies Justice Marshall's prediction, in his concurring opinion in
Batson, that attorneys will easily contrive and assert facially race-neutral
explanations for striking jurors and that courts will be ill-equipped to
second-guess those explanations. 293
 Justice Marshall warned that if such
explanations satisfy the prosecutor's obligation to explain the peremp-
tory strike on race-neutral grounds, then the protection erected by
Batson "may be illusory. "294
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the second prong
of the Batson test in Hernandez v. New York, stated that counsel need
merely put forth a facially race-neutral explanation. 295 In the absence
of inherently discriminatory intent, the Court held, the proffered
explanation is presumed race-neutral. 296
 Thus, at this point in the
analysis, a court may find that the explanation is not adequate as a
matter of law.297
 It is important to note the distinction between such a
finding and the court making a factual determination, under the third
prong of the Batson analysis, requiring the court to determine that a
facially race-neutral explanation does not overcome the prima facie
case because the court does not believe the proffered explanation. 298
Under the third prong of the Batson analysis, consideration of an
attorney's credibility in proffering a race-neutral explanation is a fac-
tual determination made by the trial court. 299
 In making a determina-
tion about the credibility of the attorney's intent, the court must often
of the attorneys who must justify their actions."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Overweight Schoolteacher
From New Jersey and Other Tales: The Peremptory Challenge After Batson, 25 CRIM. BULL. 57, 61
(1989) ("For prosecutors who seek to evade Baba-Ws requirements, the message of the case
appears to be this: ... you must make up some plausible reasons."); John R. Duer, Note, Batson
v. Kentucky: Will "OBatson" Be Next?, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 134, 146-47 (1989) ("What Batson
has fostered is the art of 'creative perjury,' an art which criminal prosecutors are learning to
practice with increasing skill."); Mark Curriden, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1994, at 62 ("'Any lawyer worth his or her salt can come up with a race neutral reason for
the strike,'" quoting an Atlanta criminal defense attorney). Professor Alschuler observes:
Although prosecutors may not discriminate against blacks, they may discriminate
against unemployed people, people who fail to maintain eye contact with prosecu-
tors, people who stare at prosecutors, liberals, social workers, people who live in
public housing, people who have not finished high school, and others who also
happen to be black.
Alschuler, supra note 45, at 200.
298
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see infra notes 303-48 and accompanying
text.
294 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
295
 Hernandez, Ill S. CL 1859, 1866 (1991).
296 Id.
297 See id.
"8 See id. at 1866-68.
299
 See id. at 1869.
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rely on its impression of the demeanor of the attorney who exercised
the challenge."° Furthermore, on appeal, courts accord great defer-
ence to the trial judge's determination."' Thus, a large portion of
Batson challenges come down to the credibility of the attorney who
proffered the explanation rather than the adequacy of the explanation
at law."2
A survey of the federal appellate court decisions reviewing trial
courts' evaluations of race-neutral explanations under Batson re-
vealed that of 113 cases addressing the issue, the court found the
proffered race-neutral explanation sufficient, as a matter of law, in
all but five cases." Of the five cases rejecting a proffered race-neu-
500
 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1869.
301 1d.
302 See id.
303
 This data was compiled, in part, through a search conducted by the author of this Note
on WESTLAW, on March 5, 1994 and updated on September 21, 1994 (Database: ALLFEDS;
Query: 230K33(5.15)), and, in part, through a survey published in Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson 's
Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 COR-
NELL L. REV. 336, 357-58 nn.185-86 (1993). For a similar survey published subsequent to the
completion of this Note, see Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. Mimi. J.L. REF. 229 (1993).
Swift's survey conducted on November 20, 1991, revealed that of 43 cases that evaluated
attorneys' proffered race-neutral explanations for suspect peremptory challenges, only three were
reversed on appeal. See Swift, supra, at 357-58 & nn.185-88. One case was reversed for a defective
Batson hearing conducted in camera without defense counsel. Id. at 358 n.188 (citing United
States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1990)). Thus, the court never reached the merits of the
race-neutral explanation. Id. Another case was reversed after the court found that the prosecutor
did not provide an adequate race-neutral explanation for striking all of the Latino jurors. United
States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989). Finally, one case was reversed for the use
of gender-based peremptory challenges. Swift, supra, at 358, n.188 (citing United States v. De
Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990)). Thus, in only one case did an appeals court find a proffered
race-neutral explanation invalid.
Although Swift actually discussed 76 cases, footnote 186 only includes the 52 cases decided
through September 3, 1991. See id. at 357 n.186. This discrepancy appears to be the result of
Swift's October 1992 update of his November 20, 1991 WESTLAW search, the outcome of which
is not included in footnote 186. See id. Swift cites the following 52 cases in footnote 186 [Editors'
Note: the following cases appear in reverse chronological order by date of decision]: United States
v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Guerra•Marez, 928 F.2d 665 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Valley, 928 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 907 (1992); United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847 (7th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Miller, 939 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Jones, 938 F.2d 838 (8th
Cir. 1991); Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991);
United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102
(10th Cir. 1991); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516
(1992); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279
(1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991); Love v. Jones, 923 F.2d 816 (11th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Biaggi, 909
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38
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(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990); Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Castille v. Harrison, 111 S. Ct. 568 (1990); United States v. Roberts,
913 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2264 (1991); United States v. De La Rosa,
911 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d
1168 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub non
Usman v. United States, 111 S. CL 173 (1990); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1137 (1991); United States v. Matha, 915 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Guiffrida v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 971 (1991); United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Thomas, 914 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hughes, 911 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 11 S. Ct. 304 (1990); United States
v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), rev V., 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane); United
States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1990); Barfield v, Orange County, 911 F.2d 644 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d
1121 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1028 (1989); United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Power, 881
F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Hamilton,
850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); United States v. Terrazas-Car-
rasco, 861 E2d 93 (5th Cir, 1988); United States v. Tucker, 836 E2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989); United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1987); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (811i Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Jones v. Garrett, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302
(10th Cir. 1987).
Of the 52 cases cited by Swift, nine did not apply Batson and, thus, are irrelevant. The search
conducted by the author of this Note updates Swift's November 21, 1991 search through Septem-
ber 21, 1994. This updated search revealed the following 70 cases [Editors' Note: the following
cases appear in reverse chronological order by date of decision]: United States v. Wallace, No.
93-3178, 1994 WL 486877 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 1994); Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.3d 109 (11th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d
1533 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487 (8th Cir. 1994); Burks v. Borg, 27
F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458 (8th Cir. 1994); Jackson v. City of
Little Rock, 26 F.3d 88 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
No. 94-5952, 1994 WL 512738 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1994); Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1994);
Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Shackelford v. United
States, 63 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 94-5426); United States v. McCoy, 23 F.3d 216
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1994); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d
857 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. fitted, No. 94-5869 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1994); United States v. Munoz, 15
F.3d 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2149 (1994); United States v. Clay, 16 F.3d 892 (8th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1994); Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gonsalez-
Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994); United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct .. 739 (1994); United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1385 (1994); Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 1208
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tral explanation, two were heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals."" Of the three remaining cases, one was heard in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals,'" another in the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals,'" and the last in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals."
In sustaining peremptory challenges, courts have allowed both ob-
jective and subjective explanations.'" The circuit courts have
largely allowed objective explanations relating to venirepersons such
(1994); Boyd v. Croose, 4 F.3d 669 (8th Cir, 1993); United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904 (10th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Nottingham v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1081 (1994); United States
v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994); United States v. Brooks,
2 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct, 1117 (1994); United States v. Cure, 996 F.2d
1136 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1075 (1994); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 619 (1993);
United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fuentez v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 355 (1993); United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702 (Ildi Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 396 (1993); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993); United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1993); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Nunn v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 266, and sub nom. White v, United States, 114 S. Ct. 560
(1993); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 155 (1993); Soler
v. Waite, 989 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Yankton, 986 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993); United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2446 (1993); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v,
Cobh, 975 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1397 and 113 S. Ct. 1596 (1993); United
States v. Daly, 974 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993); Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. 0_, 1060 (1993); Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct.
982 (1993); United States v. Thomas, 971 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 122
(1993); United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992);
United States v. Hughes, 970 F,2d 227 (7th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (11th Cir.
1992); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Castro-Romero, 964 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992); United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1992); Hopson
v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992); Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th
Cir. 1992); Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416
(3d Cir. 1992); Moore v. Keller Indus„ Inc., 948 F.2d 199 (5th Cir, 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1945 (1992); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alvarado, 951
F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454 (81.11 Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 315
(1991).
34/4
 Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826; United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
3t5Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 975 (3d Cir. 1993).
906 ,Spiunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1992).
51I7 Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir, 1994).
3°8 See infra notes 309-20 and accompanying text.
192	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 36:161
as employment,3°9	education,"°	 age,3"	 housing,"?	 marital
3°9 [Editor's Note: the following cases appear in reverse chronological order by date of
decision]: United States v. Wallace, No. 93-3178, 1994 WL 486877, at *2 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1994)
(one venireperson employed by local police force, one retired and three others social workers);
Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.3d 109, 112 (11th Cir, 1994) (not employed at same job for at least
five years); United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1167 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (one venireperson a
teacher and another unemployed); United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1049 (4th Cir. 1993)
(unemployed); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir, 1993) (artist), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1236 (1994); United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 913 (10th Cir. 1993) (school teacher),
cert. denied sub nom. Nottingham v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1081 (1994); United States v. Bynum,
3 F.3d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1993) (unemployed), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994); United States
v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (employed only for short time); United States v.
Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.) (employed at Pearl Harbor shipyard where there was a
major fraud prosecution), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993); United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995
F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993) (postal employee), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994); United States
v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1466 (5th Cir.) (employment), cert. denied sub nom. Nunn v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 266 (1993); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1108 (5th Cir.) (worked with
mentally-handicapped children), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 155 (1993); Soler v. Waite, 989 F.2d 251,
254 (7th Cir. 1993) (medical background would color ability to consider medical evidence in
trial); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (non-supervisory position); United
States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1402 (5th Cir. 1992) (one venireperson's company under inves-
tigation by federal authority and another was speech therapy teacher's aide), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1812 (1993); United States v. Thomas, 971 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1992) (laborer), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 122 (1993); United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (recently
unemployed, however, not seeking new employment); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466 (11th
Cir. 1992) (unemployed); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1125 (7th
Cir. 1992) (hairdresser); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1377 (8th Cir. 1992) (unem-
ployed); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (one juror worked at hotel whose
occupants and employees were focus of numerous criminal investigations and other juror had
sporadic employment as teacher).
31° United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1167 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (uneducated); United
States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1465 (8th Cir. 1994) (trained in naval law); United States v. Marin,
7 F.3d 679, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (eighth grade education), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 739 (1994);
Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.Scl. 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor concerned about education and
literacy of venireperson where venireperson had not heard of highly publicized case), cert. denied,
62 U.S.L.W. 3574 (1994); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.) (educational
level), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631 (5th Cir. 1992) (three veniremembers
challenged because they had not completed high school).
311 United States v. Wallace, No. 93-3178, 1994 WL 486877, at *2 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1994)
(seemed "feeble and old"); United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994) (young);
United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) (only 25 years old), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1236 (1994); United States v. Bynum, 3 E3d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1993) (young), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor
preferred people who were "a little older"), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993); United States v.
Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1451 (7th Cir.) (young), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993); United States
v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1992) (elderly), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1397 (1993); United
States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (young); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973,
979 (8th Cir. 1991) (young).
312 Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.Sd 109, 112 (Ilth Cir. 1994) (one venireperson did not own
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status,313 and crimes314 or employment of relatives. 315 The courts have
also allowed such subjective explanations as appearance,'" language
home for at least five years and another lived near crime scene); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d
1401, 1405-06 (8th Cir.) (did not reside in community), cert. denied, No. 94-5952, 1994 WL
512738 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1994); United States v. Clay, 16 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1994) (resided in
abutting community); United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994) (venireperson
resided in same area as defendant); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir, 1993) (failed
to respond on questionnaire if rented or owned home), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994);
United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993) (renter), cm. denied, 114 S. CL 920
(1994); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (renter; showed lack of community
attachment); see also United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1049 (4th Cir. 1993) (venireperson's
relative resided in same area as defendant).
51 United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994) (single); United States v.
Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1993) (single mother), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994);
United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993) (single parent), cert. denied, 114 S.
CL 920 (1994); United States v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1451 (7th Cir.) (desire to exclude young,
single people), cert. denied sub nom. Castaneda v. United States, 113 S. Ct, 2433 (1993); United
States v. Thomas, 971 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1992) (single), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 122 (1993);
United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (single mother).
3t4 Jackson v. City of Little Rock, 26 F.3d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1994) (son incarcerated for drug
offense); United States v. McCoy, 23 F.3d 216, 217 (9th Cir. 1994) (three children have "problems"
with gangs); United States v, Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir. 1994) (two family members arrested
for drug offenses); United States v. Brooks, 2 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1993) (relative in jail for
drugs), cert, denied, 114 S, Ct. 1117 (1994); United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662, 672 (8th
Cir.) (challenged venireperson testified in case in which her sister had been criminal defendant),
cert. denied sub nom. Fuentez v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 355 (1993); United States v. Yankton,
986 F.2d 1225, 1231 (8th Cir. 1993) (brother being prosecuted for serious crime); United States
v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1992) (cousin served two years in jail for drug and robbery
offenses and awaited trial on similar offenses again); see also United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207,
211 (8th Cir. 1992) (brother once addicted to cocaine).
315 United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1167 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (daughter employed in
drug counseling); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1405-06 (8th Cir.) (daughter employed
as low-level government employee), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512738 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1994) (No.
94-5952); United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1994) (relatives who
were police officers); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1377 (8th Cir. 1992) (mother
previously worked for organization that assisted public defender's office).
3 I 6 United States v. Wallace, No. 93-3178, 1994 WL 486877, at *2 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1994)
(failed to remove hat); United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1049 (4th Cir. 1993) (shabby dress
suggested irresponsible attitude towards jury service); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448,
1454 (9th Cir.) (long hair and beard associated with "hippies"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993);
United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (appearance went into the "equation").
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skills, 317 eye contact, 318 intuition 3 ' 9
 and inattentiveness."°
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in United States v.
Lorenzo, in 1993, typifies the way most courts handle a Batson claim."'
A grand jury indicted fifteen individuals on seventy-nine counts of
various violations arising out of their use of a tax protest method
known as the "redemption" scheme,'" The indictment charged that
the defendants conspired to file false documents with the Internal
Revenue Service and to impede the administration of justice. 323 The
"redemption" scheme advocated the use of federal income tax forms
by an "injured" party as a means of retaliating against those deemed
317
 [Editor's Note: the following cases appear in reverse chronological order by date of
decision]: Byse, 28 F.3d at 1167 & n.2 (inarticulate); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 866 (3rd
Cir.) (Spanish-speaking venirepersons might not follow official translation of Spanish-language
evidence), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-5869 (Aug. 4, 1994); Boyd v. Grouse, 4 F.3d 669, 672 (8th
Cir. 1993) (venireperson difficult to understand); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th
Cir. 1993) (Spanish-speaking venireperson might nut follow official translation of Spanish-speak-
ing witnesses); United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.) (Spanish-speaking venireper-
son spoke English poorly), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 619 (1993); United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d
416, 419 (3d Cir. 1992) (venireperson "inarticulate").
3111
	 States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994) (venireperson made eye
contact with defendant when asked if he knew defendant); Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 83, 85
(5th Cir. 1992) (eye contact), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 982 (1993); United States v. Swinney, 970
F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir.) (venireperson's sunglasses prevented eye contact with prosecutor), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992).
319
 Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1992) (proffered justification based upon
subjective evaluations adequate), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1060 (1993); United States v. Hughes,
970 F.2d 227, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1992) (approving intuitive assumptions); United States v. Hinojosa,
958 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1992) ("valid reasons for exclusion may include intuitive assump-
tions").
32U
 United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1493 (8th Cir. 1994) (inattentive or asleep during
voir dire); United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1994) (inattentive); United
States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1160 (7th Cir. 1994) (bored or disinterested appearance); United
States v. Chandler, 12 Rid 1427, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994) (appeared inattentive); United States v.
Johnson, 4 F.3c1 904, 913 (10th Cir. 1993) (inattentive to court's questions during voir dire), cert.
denied sub nom. Nottingham v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1081 (1994); United States v. Changco,
1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.) (inattentiveness valid explanation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 619 (1993);
United States v. Cure, 996 F.2d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 1993) ("venireperson not paying attention
and was reading a book instead of following proceedings"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1075 (1994);
United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor preferred attentive venirep-
ersons), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1466 (5th Cir.)
(inattentiveness valid explanation), cert. denied sub nom. Nunn v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 266
(1993); United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1992) (venireperson not paying
attention), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1397 (1993); United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1403 (5th
Cir. 1992) (venireperson sleeping); United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1992)
(venireperson appeared inattentive).
321
 United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2(1 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225 (1993).
322 Id.
323 Id.
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responsible for wrongs against that person. 324 For example, aggrieved
parties utilizing the scheme filed false tax forms seeking tax refunds
and claiming payment of compensation to government officials. 325 The
participants sought to use the false filings to harass the government
officials and hopefully receive payment through tax refunds, although
fraudulently induced. The defendants used the "redemption" scheme
against a number of state and federal officials, including the Governor
of Hawaii, against whom they had grievances primarily based upon
perceived violations of native Hawaiian rights. 32°
At the trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii, the prosecution used three of its six peremptory challenges to
strike three potential jurors with "Hawaiian or Polynesian surnames."327
The defendants argued that these strikes were racially motivated in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 328 The Government, however,
articulated explanations for the peremptory strikes which the trial
court deemed race-neutral and credible. 329
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the trial court's finding."° The
Government offered several race-neutral explanations for its strikes."'
It challenged the first juror, Vaifa, a Samoan chieftain, because he had
fallen asleep during the voir dire and because he had walked in and
out of the voir dire at times when jurors were not supposed to be
present. 332 The prosecutor also stated, that he "got the feeling that he
was somewhat disoriented . . . and, again, my consistent theme here is
I would prefer people who have more attentiveness, a little older and
educated."333 Declaring the lack of attentiveness a facially race-neutral
explanation, the appellate court upheld the strike. 334
The second juror, Akuna, asked to be excused during voir dire on
account of hardship because he was the only person in his family who
worked and would not receive wages for the period while on jury
duty."' The trial court considered excusing Akuna; however, in light
of the dwindling venire the judge suggested to counsel on several
324 Id,
323 Id. at 1452.
326 Lorenzo, 995 F.2(1 al 1452.
327 1d. at 1453.
328 Id.
33 ki. at 1454, 1455.
"I Id. at 1455.
331 Lorenzo, 995 Eat at 1454.
332 Id.
333 Id.
"4 Id.
355 Id.
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occasions that they consider peremptory challenges for those members
who asked to be excused.336
 Thus, the prosecution based its strike on
the concern that the juror might hold his loss of pay against the
prosecution."S7
 The trial court accepted this explanation and the circuit
court affirmed.'"
The court scrutinized the challenge of the final juror most closely." 9
The Government challenged Kahoiwai, the third juror, because of a
concern about jurors who might question the importance of govern-
ment in such a politically-charged case.'" The prosecution inferred
Kahoiwai's political philosophy from his "long, unkempt" hair and
long beard, and "associated his appearance with the counter-culture
beliefs of 'hippies.'"su In addition, the prosecutor expressed concern
about the juror's level of education and the fact that he was employed
at a shipyard where recently a major fraud investigation took place.942
The trial court, disturbed by the prosecution's attitude toward persons
with long hair and beards, noted that two of the defendants had beards
and another long hair, but concluded that there was nothing in the
law to preclude a party from challenging a person with a beard.ms The
circuit court affirmed the trial court's finding, noting that concern that
a juror may identify with the defendant for reasons other than those
that act as a proxy for race suffice as race-neutral explanations.TM 4
Lorenzo exemplifies the great deference appellate courts pay to a
trial court's evaluation of the race-neutrality of Batson explanations.'"
The appeals court deferred in each instance such that no jurors with
Hawaiian or Polynesian surnames made it to the petit jury.TM 6
 Lorenzo
also illustrates trial courts' minimal scrutiny of proffered race-neutral
explanations.TM 7
 Thus, in most cases the courts' willingness to find
various subjective and objective explanations as race-neutral allows
attorneys to remove jurors on account of race if the attorney merely
proffers a facially race-neutral explanation.TM 3
336 Lorenzo, 995 F.2d at 1454.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 1454,1455.
333 See id. at 1454.
343
 Id.
341 Lorenzo, 995 F.2d at 1454.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
545
 See id. at 1454-55.
346 Lorenzo, 995 F.2d at 1454-55.
347 See id. at 1454.
343
 See supra notes 303-20 and accompanying text..
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rv. GENDER AND BEYOND
Although the Court extended the Batson theory to gender, the
Batson reality will more likely prevail in practice. Nothing in the J.E.B.
opinion indicates that courts will not follow the same patterns of
application of Batson in the sphere of gender. Thus, as a practical
matter, the extension to gender will have little or no effect upon the
role of gender in jury selection beyond the additional costs of admin-
istering the extra equal protection claims.
The Batson decision, upon which J.E.B. rests, fails to effectively
eliminate race as a consideration in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.349 Although attorneys may no longer act without justification—
in all circumstances—when exercising peremptory strikes, they gener-
ally do not have to meet a difficult burden to justify their peremptory
challenges. Batson effectively requires attorneys who wish to strike a
venireperson because of the venireperson's race to find creative expla-
nations for the strike and to seem credible when advancing those
explanations. Moreover, many federal circuits do not appear to even
require particularly creative race-neutral explanations."° Explanations
based upon the perceptions of an attorney, such as eye contact, atti-
tude, demeanor and appearance, allow such an attorney to exercise
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges under the cover of un-
detectable pretext. Pretext in a Batson challenge is largely undetectable
because an attorney willing to proffer a pretextual explanation will
carefully select criteria that apply to the juror and seem relatively
innocuous to the court.
It is doubtful that courts will alter the jurisprudence governing the
Batson doctrine merely because another protected category, namely
gender, has been established. It is equally doubtful that extension to
gender will alter the actions of the bar. Attorneys will merely adjust the
pool of valid explanations that they utilize. In fact, most attorneys need
only make minor alterations in their peremptory challenge strategies
to negotiate around J.E.B. because the arsenal of acceptable explana-
tions remains so expansive. Attorneys will continue to use objective and
subjective race- and gender-neutral explanations based upon age, em-
ployment, education, housing, marital status, crimes and employment
of relatives, appearance, language skills, eye contact, intuition and
inattentiveness. Under the current application of Batson, for example,
if a hypothetical attorney wishes to strike a Latino venirewoman be-
319 See supra notes 303-20 and accompanying text.
35° See supra notes 309-20 and accompanying text.
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cause of prejudice towards Latinos, the attorney, through minimal
creativity, can successfully justify a peremptory challenge with a facially
race-neutral explanation in the face of opposing counsel's prima facie
case under Batson. 351
 A moderately creative attorney may find a facially
race-neutral explanation in the venireperson's courtroom demeanor,
age, clothing, occupation, language skills or education.
Gender-based peremptory challenges are vulnerable to the same
abuse as race-based peremptory challenges. If the same hypothetical
attorney wishes to strike the Latino woman based on her gender, the
attorney can utilize most or all of the objective and subjective charac-
teristics, described above, as gender-neutral explanations. This attor-
ney will, in anticipation of an equal protection challenge, consider
which facially gender-neutral explanations apply to the venirewoman.
If the potential juror is a shabby dresser, the attorney may argue that
the potential juror's clothing illustrates a lack of respect for the judicial
process. In the case of a high school drop-out, the attorney could
contend that the complex nature of the facts requires a level of under-
standing consistent with a high school graduate. The attorney may also
attempt to isolate gender-neutral factors that are particular to the
venirewoman to weaken the appearance of pretext. The possible fact that
she is the only shabby dresser or high school drop-out on the venire
diminishes the appearance of pretext. Upon an equal protection-based
objection to a peremptory challenge, the attorney will merely assert
the prepared gender-neutral explanation. In most instances the court
will accept the explanation as it does for most race-based challenges.
As Batson is extended to "protect" additional classifications, the
peremptory challenge system is diluted because attorneys must justify
their peremptory challenges more often. Accordingly, some members
of the Court have criticized the Court for the original decision in
Batson because they believe it started the peremptory challenge down
the proverbial slippery slope, spelling the ultimate demise of the per-
emptory challenge system. 552 In contrast, other commentators argue
the merits of Batson and that the judiciary should enforce Batson more
effectively. 353
 The difficulty with this position is that although the judi-
ciary might make Batson slightly more effective through the develop-
ment of common law doctrine, it cannot properly account for the
effect this would have on the jury selection system.
3" See supra notes 211,309-20 and accompanying text.
452 See supra notes 267-81 and accompanying text.
353
 E.g., Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 303, at 267-68 (1993); Swift, supra note 303, at
361-68.
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Adjustments and criticism will not determine the future of the
peremptory challenge in the United States. Given Batson and J.E.B., it
is not outrageous to anticipate that the Court will expand the protec-
tive reach of Batson and its progeny to protect other classes. 354 Indeed,
the Court has chipped away at the traditional peremptory challenge
for almost a decade. 355
 Minor adjustments in the implementation of
Batson will not address the basic survival of the peremptory challenge
system. While this system cannot return to its status prior to Batson, it
can retain its purpose."6
The difficulty of effectively implementing the peremptory chal-
lenge in compliance with Batson, and now J.E.B., illustrates the need
to face the peremptory challenge with reason informed by ample
debate. We must decide whether the peremptory challenge system will
survive. If it is to survive then we must create a solution that will
conform to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. If it is
not to survive then we must consider whether other methods of ex-
cluding biased jurors, such as expanded voir dire questioning, will take
its place.
The Judicial Conference, established pursuant to the Rules Ena-
bling Act, 557
 should undertake an examination of this issue and pro-
pose new comprehensive rules for inclusion within both the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.3" The states could then utilize
the new rules as examples of how to amend their own laws. The Judicial
Conference could analyze and debate the effect Batson has on the
current jury selection system and then propose adjustments to the
system where necessary. Adjustment or alteration of the application of
the peremptory challenge system through the development of the
35 ' 1 See supra notes 169-70, '267.
355
 See supra note 3.
See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
557 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072, 2073(a) (1) (1988).
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The Federal Rules of Civil [and Criminal Procedure] govern the conduct of civil
[and criminal) trials in federal court. Their authority comes from Congress, but,
unlike the Judiciary Code [Tide 28 of the United States Code), the Rules are not
a product of direct congressional legislation. Instead Congress has enacted 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (the Rules Enabling Act), which authorizes the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure.
Although the Rules Enabling Act gives the Supreme Court power to promulgate
the Rules, the Justices do nut in practice do the actual drafting. That process instead
occurs in committees of the Judicial Conference, a supervisory and administrative
arm of the federal courts... „Judges, practitioners, and scholars are appointed to
these advisory committees.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, rr AL., FEDERAL. RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE xiii (Stipp. 1994).
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common law will not resolve the problems the courts have encoun-
tered in the application of Batson. Surely the courts may manipulate
the application of the Batson three-pronged test. Depending on the
leanings of any given judge, however, this will not result in a compre-
hensive and effective system because results will vary by jurisdiction.
An effective solution requires a head-on confrontation with basic policy
choices and resolution by new global rules of procedure. These changes
are most appropriately dealt with by the Judicial Conference within the
Rules Enabling Act framework.
V. CONCLUSION
The peremptory challenge, historically, did not require attorneys
to explain the basis for its use during jury selection. Currently, the
Court requires an attorney to proffer a race-neutral explanation for a
peremptory challenge if opposing counsel has made a prima facie case
of racial motivation. This burden-shifting scheme, however, has been
ineffective because the courts have accepted most explanations as
race-neutral, and attorneys may easily thwart the race-neutral require-
ment. Moreover, the elimination of gender as a valid justification for
the exercise of peremptory challenges will not effectively eliminate
peremptory challenges based solely on gender. The Judicial Confer-
ence must face basic policy considerations implicated by the peremp-
tory challenge and the Batson line of cases head-on or we risk perpetu-
ation of a wasteful and ineffective process.
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